ABSTRACT The fast progression of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has resulted in a large number of vehicles connecting to networks. This leads to massive growth in the data collected from vehicles via IoV. Fortunately, cloud computing provides a vast range of services such as operating systems, hardware, software, and resources. Therefore, the massive amount of data cumulated through IoV can be outsourced to the cloud. However, considering the untrusted nature of the cloud, the cumulated data must be encrypted before it is outsourced to the cloud server. Unfortunately, this ensures to difficulty while searching the data. To address this challenge, an efficient certificateless public key cryptography with equality test (CL-PKC-ET) is presented in this paper. In this scheme, the authorized cloud server has the permission to execute the equality test on encrypted data and retrieve the result without knowing any relevant information about the ciphertext. Our CL-PKC-ET scheme is demonstrated under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Ultimately, we compare the CL-PKE-ET with a state-of-art scheme and the performance evaluation indicates that our scheme accomplishes 96.40%, 32.08%, and 43.98% reduction in computation costs during the encryption, decryption, and test stages, respectively. Therefore, we assert that our scheme is ideal for deployment in both the cloud and IoV environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The paramount growth of Internet of Things (IoT) technologies such as wireless sensor networks, purpose to define the future for humans. The interconnected devices in IoT [2] allow for information flow by making use of the wireless network technology. One of the major areas that IoT has revolutionized is the smart-transport sector which has seen the mobilization of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) [9] . The IoV can be viewed as an extension of IoT as it achieves the consolidation of management in the transportation area [12] . The IoV is a network that comprises vehicles that are IoT-enabled through the integration of information within the network. Such information comprises of the location of vehicles, their momentum, and even the routes they use. Such information is collected by the use of sensors and devices located within the vehicles [13] .
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As communication and computation technologies continue to evolve, growth in the number of vehicles being linked to the IoT has turned the IoV into an interactive network of importance. Vehicles can therefore communicate with each other in an instant. This instant communication means vehicles can receive notifications from their sensors on things like braking, lane changing or even negotiating corners. With such notifications, there is efficiency in managing heavy traffic and the conveyance of passengers is smooth and safe [22] . The continuous generation of notifications from various sensors means a large amount of data accrued from various places and is of different attributes. All this large amounts of data and information include private details like the real-time location of a vehicle and data associated with the driving state information and traffic safety [34] . The growth in vehicles connecting to the Internet, has resulted in the collection of vast amounts of data across the vehicle and application platforms. However, given the nodes restrained resources in IoV [12] , cloud computing [30] is the perfect solution, as it is able to outsource almost unlimited storage resources and resource processing. Therefore, the IoV nodes can outsource the large amounts of data to the cloud server. However, the process of outsourcing this data to the cloud servers leads to users losing control over their data. This is because the data could be changed, erased, modified or rather completely damaged beyond recovery. For that reason, it is imperative to see to it that the reliability, integrity, and confidentiality of the data is maintained [8] . To ensure that these qualities are upheld, it is important to encrypt the data before it is outsourced to the cloud server. Consequently, the typical scenario of IoV is showed in FIGURE 1. In this scenario, the aim is to ensure the data cumulated by vehicle nodes which is relayed to the cloud server by sink nodes, is easily accessible from anywhere. The collected data is encrypted by the vehicle nodes before outsourcing to the cloud server. Hence, only the authorized user can access the data from anywhere. For further clarification, we consider a scenario where a police traffic department wants to know all the vehicles that are in a particular location at a given time. Knowing that, all the data stored in the cloud server for these vehicles is encrypted. Thus, the police traffic department must send a query to the cloud server that includes the specific time and location, which in turn will search the stored data and then return the information of vehicles that were present in the specified time and location. Finally, the police traffic department can decrypt the search result received from the cloud server because this information is encrypted using the public key of the police traffic department.
Encryption also ensures that the cloud service providers involved are not accessing users' data without consent or accidentally exposing their data. Later on, the authorized users may want to access this encrypted data and information and therefore they have to search through it. This whole process would definitely incur high costs during computation and communication. It would also consume a lot of time and when considered in real-time application it is unrealistic. Boneh et al. [4] proposed a notion of public key encryption with keyword search (PKE-KS) to assist users in retrieving their information effectively. However, for this PKE-KS scheme, the cloud server only compares keywords and trapdoors that have been encrypted with the same public keys. Unfortunately, due to the IoV possessing a heterogeneous nature, this scheme becomes unsuitable for searching the cloud. Therefore, to deal with this problem, Yang et al. [33] proposed a notion of public key encryption with equality test (PKE-ET). Here, the search functionality can be performed between a pair of ciphertexts that are encrypted with the same public key and also with different public keys.
The PKE-ET scheme managed to achieve the search functionality requirements within the cloud server. However, this scheme is still constructed on the basis of the public key infrastructure (PKI). This means each user's public key must 68958 VOLUME 7, 2019 be authenticated by a certificate, specifically a digital signature that is generated by a certificate authority (CA). Ma [18] further proposed a notion of identity-based encryption with equality test (IBE-ET). This scheme is constructed from the identity-based cryptosystem (IBC). In this scheme, the certificates that were found in the PKI system were eliminated as a result of setting the user's identity as their public key. Nonetheless, this scheme faces difficulties prompted by the key escrow. This happens when decryption keys are allocated in the care of third parties known as private key generators (PKG). In this case, the PKG can access the users' encrypted data at any given time. Al-Riyami et al. [1] therefore presented a notion of the certificateless public key cryptosystem (CL-PKC), where users would own private keys that are in two parts. The first part is created by the key generation center (KGC), while a second part is created by the user. Here, the KGC only has partial access to the private key of a user to prevent it from accessing the user's data. Qu et al. [23] further presented a new scheme where he incorporated the notion of PKE-ET and CL-PKC which is known as certificateless public key cryptosystem supporting equivalence test (CL-PKC-ET). However, Qu et al.'s scheme is inefficient, especially in the IoV environment relative to the limited resources in the sensor nodes, which encrypt data and transmit it to the cloud server.
A. CONTRIBUTION
To deal with the problems mentioned above, our paper presents an efficient certificateless public key cryptography with equality test (CL-PKC-ET) for the IoV environment. We summarize this paper's contributions as follows. 1) By incorporating the notion of PKE-ET and CL-PKC, the CL-PKC-ET scheme is proposed in this paper. In this scheme, the authorized cloud server is allowed to execute the equality test on encrypted data and then retrieves the result without any knowledge of the relevant information about the ciphertext. 2) We also propose the concrete construction of the CL-PKC-ET scheme. We further prove the security of our suggested scheme under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. 3) Eventually, our CL-PKC-ET is compared with the state-of-art scheme. The performance evaluation demonstrates that our suggested scheme is ideal in the IoV environment.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. The definition of CL-PKC-ET such as preliminaries, the system model, CL-PKC-ET's framework as well as the security model are illustrated in Section II. The concrete construction is illustrated in Section III, while the security analysis of our proposed scheme is discussed in Section IV. In Section V, the performance analysis of our suggested scheme is presented. Eventually, the conclusion of our paper is given in Section VI.
B. RELATED WORKS 1) BACKGROUND OF IoV
The fact that more vehicles are connecting to IoV networks everyday, means there is a huge amount of data that is collected through the nodes of these vehicles. Therefore, the security and privacy of this huge amounts of data is important. Mershad and Artail [21] suggested a security scheme for the information and messages interchanged between the users and roadside units. Unfortunately, IoV was not quite scalable hence scalability was still an issue. Wu et al. [29] proposed a system which would efficiently balance the public safety and vehicle privacy that ensures the reliability of messages. Wang et al. [27] however presented a mechanism that would guarantee security for the privacy-preserving communication with convenient cryptographic primitives within the vehicleto-grid networks. Additionally, Cardenas et al. [5] and Xu et al. [31] developed a mechanism for the security and privacy of the big data sector. Furthermore, Liu et al. [16] suggested a scheme based on key exchange to ensure the scheduling of big data is secure. Moreover, Li et al. in [15] and [14] proposed a notion that focused on the security models that would be able to resolve the issue on authentication and privacy issues in corresponding areas. Recently, Guo et al. [10] proposed a secure mechanism for big data collection in a large scale IoV scheme. In Guo et al.'s scheme, there is an improvement in the security and privacy of data collected in IoV. However, all the above-mentioned schemes have been concerned with methods of data collection, storage confidentially and privacy but have not addressed how we can search on the data cumulated in the cloud server.
2) PKE-ET
To address this issue in the IoV era, public key encryption with equality test (PKE-ET) [33] was first proposed by Yang et al. The PKE-ET scheme was designed to provide a platform where any user could compare a pair of ciphertexts and examine whether the encryptions are of the same message, even though the ciphertexts are generated by different public keys. However, Tang proposed a fine-grained authorization on the public key encryption with equality test in order to reduce the vulnerabilities within PKE-ET. This scheme was referred to as fine-grained authorization public key encryption with equality test (FG-PKE-ET) [24] . In this scheme, two users have the right to run an authorization algorithm to generate a token that would be given to a semitrusted proxy. The proxy would then execute an equality test between the users' ciphertexts. Moreover, Tang further introduced a two-proxy setting scheme [25] , where the two proxies function together to perform the equality test. In addition, Tang proposed a more refined scheme referred to as all-or-nothing PKE-ET (AON-PKE-ET) [26] . In this scheme, the equality test is performed in a coarser granularity manner. This means when a proxy receives a token, it can execute an equivalence test between a given user and any other user. In addition, Ma et al. proposed a public key encryption VOLUME 7, 2019 scheme with delegated equality test (PKE-DET) [20] , where only a delegated party is able to perform an equivalence test in a practical multi-user setting. This means the designated server can test if the ciphertexts contain the same message even without decrypting them. However, a non-delegated server should not be allowed to deduce any substantial information from the encrypted data while the equality test is being performed. Huang et al. further proposed a scheme that authorized the equality test performed known as public key encryption with authorized equality test (PKE-AET) [11] . In this scheme, users have the mandate to perform an equivalence test between two ciphertexts or two specified ciphertexts. Ma et al. further improved the PKE-AET by suggesting a scheme that provided flexibility in authorization referred to as public key encryption with equality test incorporating flexible authorization (PKE-ET-FA) [19] . In this scheme, four authorization policies are simultaneously implemented in order to enhance privacy. Besides, the venture into the 5G networks in relation to the PKE-ET, propagated Xu et al. to propose a scheme that supports three types of authorization that occur simultaneously [32] . In addition, the scheme verifies the results it receives from an untrusted server, and the user can further evaluate whether the cloud has correctly performed the authorized equality test. In spite of that, the schemes mentioned above are still constructed on the basis of public key infrastructure (PKI). This means each user requires their public key authenticated by a certificate, specifically a digital signature that is generated by the CA.
3) IBE-ET
To deal with issues concerning the management of certificates, and some problems related with them, Ma proposed an identity-based encryption with equality Test (IBE-ET) [18] . The IBE-ET scheme incorporated attributes of both public key encryption and identity-based encryption schemes. Recently, Wu et al. [28] presented an efficient IBE-ET scheme, which decreases the need for timeconsuming HashToPoint function in Ma's scheme. Nonetheless, the IBE-ET schemes face difficulties that are brought about by the key escrow problem.
4) CL-PKC-ET
To solve the key escrow problem, Qu et al. [23] presented a new scheme where he incorporated the notion of PKE-ET and CL-PKC, referred to as certificateless public key cryptography with equality test (CL-PKC-ET). However, Qu et al.'s scheme is inefficient, especially in the IoV environment relative to the limited resources in the sensor nodes, which encrypt data and transmit it to the cloud server.
II. DEFINITIONS A. PRELIMINARIES 1) BILINEAR MAP
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same prime order q. Let P be a generator of G 1 . A bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 should satisfy the following conditions: 1) Bilinearity: For any two random points X , Y ∈ R G 1 and any two random numbers a, b
2) Non-degeneracy: If P is a generator of group G 1 , e(P, P) = 1 G 2 . 3) Computability: For any two random points X , Y ∈ R G 1 , an efficient algorithm is required to compute e(X , Y ).
2) MODIFIED BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN INVERSION (mBDHI) PROBLEM
Given two groups G 1 , G 2 with the same prime order q. Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be an admissible bilinear map and let P be a generator of G 1 . The mBDHI problem in < G 1 , G 2 , e > is to compute e(P, P)
B. SYSTEM MODEL FIGURE 2 illustrates the CL-PKC-ET's system model. The units of this system work as follows. 1) Registration: In this phase, the IoV nodes and the authorized users send their identities to the key generation center (KGC). The KGC then returns the partial private key to the IoV nodes and authorized users. Then, the IoV node and authorized user can generate the full-private key. 2) Setup: In this phase, the IoV node encrypts the collected data and outsources it to the cloud server. Additionally, the IoV node generates the trapdoor by using its private key and conveys it to the cloud server. In addition, the authorized user uses his/her secret key to create trapdoor and sends it to the cloud. 3) Query: In this phase, when an authorized user needs to return the data stored on the cloud server, he/she sends a query (keywords) to the cloud server. The keywords in the query depend on what the authorized user needs. For example, if the authorized user wants to retrieve encrypted data related to a specific vehicle, the query must contain the vehicle ID and other keywords related to the query such as location, time, etc. 4) Search: In this phase, the cloud server is delegated to perform the equality test after receiving the trapdoor from the IoV nodes and authorized users. The cloud server then conveys the result to the authorized users. Note that, only the authorized user can perform the decryption of the result.
C. FRAMEWORK OF CL-PKC-ET
A certificateless public key cryptography scheme that entails equality test is described using the following algorithms: 1) Setup: The KGC runs this algorithm. It uses k as input for the security parameter and outputs the public parameters params and a master secret key msk.
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FIGURE 2. System model of CL-PKC-ET.
2) Partial-Private-Key-Extraction: The KGC also runs this algorithm. It uses as input params, msk, and a public identity of a user ID ∈ {0, 1} * . It returns a partial secret key D ID . 3) User-Key-Generation: The user runs this algorithm.
It uses as inputs params and ID. Then, it returns the user's secret value x ID and a public key PK ID . 2) Phase 1: A 1 can issue the following queries.
• Hash queries: A 1 requests all hash random oracles, then the challenger responds to A 1 with the corresponding value.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extraction-queries ID i :
The challenger runs Partial-Private-KeyExtraction algorithm to generate D i and then sends it to A 1 .
• Set-Private-key-queries ID i : The challenger runs Set-Private-Key algorithm to generate S i and then sends it to A 1 .
• Public-key-queries ID i : The User-KeyGeneration algorithm is run by the challenger to generate PK ID i and then convey it to A 1 .
• Replace-public-key-queries ID i , PK ID i : The challenger replaces the public key PK ID i of the corresponding user with PK ID i .
• Decryption-queries ID i , C i : The challenger executes the algorithm Decrypt(C i , S i ), where S i is the secret key associated with ID i . Eventually, the challenger gives M i to A 1 .
• Trapdoor-queries: The challenger runs the Trapdoor algorithm to generate T ID i and then conveys it to A 1 . 3) Challenge: The challenger randomly picks the plaintext M ∈ {0, 1} * and computes C * = Encrypt(ID ch , M ). Eventually, the challenger gives C * to A 1 as its challenge ciphertext. 4) Phase 2: The challenger responds to A 1 in the same way as in Phase 1 on the grounds that:
• ID ch is not queried in the Set-Private-key-queries.
• If the public key associated with ID ch is replaced, the ID ch should not be queried in the PartialPrivate-Key-Extraction-queries.
• If the public key of the user is replaced, the corresponding identity ID i should not be queried in the Set-Private-key-queries.
• (ID ch , C * ) is not queried in the Decryptionqueries. 5) Guess: A 1 outputs M , and wins if M = M . The advantage of A 1 in the game above is defined as follows: , M ) . Eventually, the challenger gives C * to A 2 as its challenge ciphertext. 4) Phase 2: The challenger responds to A 2 in the same way as in Phase 1 on grounds that:
• (ID ch , C * ) is not queried in the Decryptionqueries. 5) Guess: A 2 outputs M , and wins if M = M . Therefore, A 2 's advantage in the game is: 
3) THE SECURITY OF IND-CCA FOR TYPE-3 ADVERSARY
The IND-CCA security against Type-3 adversary in CL-PKC-ET is shown as follows:
Game 3: Given that A 3 is a Type-3 adversary. The game between A 3 and the challenger is depicted as follows: 1) Setup: This algorithm is run by the challenger to generate the public parameters params and master secret key msk. Afterwards, the challenger gives params to A 3 and keeps msk secret. Furthermore, the challenger runs the Partial-Private-Key-Extraction, User-KeyGeneration, and Set-Private-Key algorithms to create n private keys S i associated with ID i , where (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Finally, the challenger gives all ID i to A 3 . 2) Phase 1: A 3 issues queries as in Game 1.
3) Challenge: A 3 gives challenger two plaintexts of equal-length M 0 , M 1 ∈ {0, 1} * . The challenger then randomly selects a bit ξ ∈ {0, 1} and computes C ξ = Encrypt(M ξ , ID ch ). The challenger then sends C ξ to A 3 as the challenge ciphertext. 4) Phase 2: The challenger responds to A 3 in a similar way as in Phase 1 on grounds that:
• If the public key associated with ID ch is replaced, the ID ch is not queried in the Partial-Private-KeyExtraction-queries.
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• (ID ch , C * ) should not be queried in the Decryptionqueries.
• ID ch should not be queried in the Trapdoorqueries. 5) Guess: A 3 outputs ξ ∈ {0, 1}, and wins if ξ = ξ .
The advantage of A 3 in the game above is depicted as follows: • ID ch is not queried in the Set-Private-key-queries.
• (ID ch , C * ) is not queried in the Decryptionqueries.
• ID ch is not queried in the Trapdoor-queries. 5) Guess: A 4 outputs ξ ∈ {0, 1}, and wins if ξ = ξ .
The advantage of A 4 in the game above is depicted as follows: 
III. CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION
In this segment, the concrete construction of CL-PKC-ET scheme is proposed as follows. 1) Setup: Given a secure parameter k, the Setup algorithm proceeds as follows:
• It generates the pairing parameters: two groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order q, and an admissible bilinear map e :
The algorithm then chooses a random generator P ∈ G 1 .
• It then chooses cryptographic hash functions:
where n is the number of bits of the message to be sent, and H 4 : G 2 → Z * p .
• Randomly choose (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ Z * p , then set P pub = s 1 P and P pub = s 2 P. The public parameters are p, G 1 , G 2 , e, g, P Pub , P Pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , where g = e(P, P).
2) Partial-Private-Key-Extraction: When the KGC receives the user identity ID, the KGC returns the partial private key
where h ID = H 1 (ID). 3) User-Key-Generation: The algorithm uses as input params and D ID . It chooses the secret value x ID ∈ Z * p and sets the public key
x ID (h ID P + P pub )).
4) Set-Private-Key:
The algorithm uses as inputs params, D ID , and x ID . It returns the full private key
where h 1 = H 2 (PK 1 ), h 2 = H 2 (PK 2 ). 5) Trapdoor: This algorithm takes as input a private key S and outputs a trapdoor
6) Encrypt: Given a message M ∈ {0, 1} * , the identity ID, and the public key PK ID = (PK 1 , PK 2 ) as inputs, the algorithm works as follows:
• Select (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ R Z * p .
• Calculate C 1 = r 1 (PK 1 + h 1 (h ID P + P pub )).
• Calculate C 2 = r 2 (PK 2 + h 2 (h ID P + P pub )). (C 1 , S 1 ) ).
• Verify if C 2 = r 2 (PK 2 + h 2 (h ID P + P pub ) and
(H 1 (M )·r 2 ) = H 4 (e(C 2 , S 2 )).
• If both verifications pass, return M . Otherwise, return the symbol ⊥.
Let U i and U j be two users of a system. Let
) be the ciphertexts of U i and U j , respectively. The Test algorithm works as follows: 
p randomly, and calculates
returns PK ID i to A 1 .
• Replace-Public-Key-queries: A 1 replaces the public key of any user with random value.
• Set-Private-Key-queries: If ID i = ID * , B 1 aborts. Else, B 1 works as follows:
-Else, B 1 generates a new private key information and returns
• Trapdoor-queries: For this query B 1 responds to the A 1 with
• Decryption-queries: 
If both verifications pass, B 1 returns M . Otherwise, B 1 aborts and rejects ciphertext. For all queries, the probability of rejected valid ciphertext is not more than q d 2 k . 3) Challenge: A 1 returns identity ID ch on which it wishes to be challenged. The algorithm B 1 chooses M * ∈ {0, 1} * , λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ Z * p , C * 3 ∈ {0, 1} * and C 4 ∈ Z * p randomly and then calculates C * 1 = λ 1 P and C * 2 = λ 2 P. Finally, B 1 sends C * to A 1 as a challenge ciphertext. A 1 can not get the plaintext unless it queries H 3 or H 4 on e(C * 1 , S 1 ). 4) Phase 2: In this phase, the response of the challenger to A 1 is similar of that one obtained in Phase 1. The following grounds are considered.
• ID ch is not queried in the Set-Private-Keyqueries.
• If the public key of the user is replaced, the corresponding identity ID i is not queried in the SetPrivate-Key-queries.
• (ID ch , C * ) should not be queried in the Decryptionqueries. 5) Guess:
Considering the L H 3 includes no more than q H 3 + q H 4 inputs, the chosen input will include the correct item ψ = e(C * 1 , S 1 ) with the probability 1/(q H 3 + 2q H 4 ). In fact, the mBDHI problem can be recognized by the following equation
According to the proof in [3] , we have e(P, P)
The advantages of B 1 is ε 1 in solving the q-IBDH problem is as follows: 1) H 1 -queries, H 2 -queries, H 3 -queries, and H 4 -queries are respond to the A 1 as in the real attack. Therefore, any response is answered with a random value. 2) All replies to Decryption-queries is valid except when E (reject a valid ciphertext) happens. The algorithm B 1 is not broken if E does not happen. Then, we have: 
Proof: 1) We demonstrate how an algorithm B 2 can solve a random given instance (P, αP, µ) of the mBDHI problem by reacting with A 2 as subroutine, where α, µ ∈ Z * p . Algorithm B 2 runs the Setup and picks a master secret key s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z * p randomly, then set P pub = s 1 P, P pub = s 2 P, and g = e(P, P). Also, B 2 picks a random challenge identity ID * ∈ {0, 1} * . Finally, B 2 gives the public parameters params and msk to A 2 how then makes the following queries. 2) Phase 1: In this phase, the response of B 2 to A 2 is similar of that one obtained in Phase 1 in proof of Lemma 1, except the Partial-secret key queries and the Replace-public-key-queries are not allowed to issue in this phase. 3) Challenge: A 2 returns identity ID ch on which it wishes to be challenged. The algorithm B 2 chooses M * ∈ {0, 1} * , λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ Z * p , C * 3 ∈ {0, 1} * and C 4 ∈ Z * p randomly and then calculates C * 1 = λ 1 P and C * 2 = λ 2 P. Finally, B 2 sends C * to A 2 as a challenge ciphertext. A 2 can not get the plaintext unless it queries H 3 or H 4 on e(C * 1 , S 1 ). 4) Phase 2: In this phase, the response of the challenger to A 2 is similar of that one obtained in Phase 1 on grounds that:
• (ID ch , C * ) is not queried in the Decryptionqueries. 5) Guess:
According to the proof in [3] , we have e(P, P) 
q e +q ex +q t Proof: 1) We demonstrate how an algorithm B 3 can solve a random given instance (P, αP, µ) of the mBDHI problem by reacting with A 3 as subroutine, where α, µ ∈ Z * p . Algorithm B 3 runs the Setup and picks a master secret key s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z * p randomly, then set P pub = s 1 P, P pub = s 2 P, and g = e(P, P). Also, B 3 picks a random challenge identity ID * ∈ {0, 1} * . Finally, B 3 gives the public parameters params and ID * to A 3 how then makes the following queries. 2) Phase 1: This phase is similar to the Phase 1 in the proof of Lemma 1. 3) Challenge: A 3 outputs two plaintext M 0 , M 1 ∈ R {0, 1} * and the identity ID ch on which it wishes to be challenged. The algorithm B 3 chooses ξ ∈ R {0, 1}, and randomly chooses λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ Z * p , C * 3 ∈ {0, 1} * and C * 4 ∈ Z * p and calculates C * 1 = λ 1 P and C * 2 = λ 2 P. Finally, B 3 sends C * ξ to A 3 as a challenge ciphertext. A 3 can not get the plaintext unless it queries H 3 or H 4 on e(C * 1 , S 1 ). 4) Phase 2: In this phase, the response of the challenger to A 3 is similar of that one obtained in Phase 1. The following grounds are considered.
68966 VOLUME 7, 2019 • If the public key of the user is replaced, the corresponding identity ID i is not queried in the SetPrivate-Key-queries.
• ID ch should not be queried in the Trapdoorqueries. 5) Guess: A 3 returns ξ for ξ . B 3 picks a random input
Considering the L H 3 includes no more than q H 3 +q H 4 inputs, the chosen input will include the correct item ψ = e(C * 1 , S 1 ) with the probability 1/ (q H 3 +2q H 4 ) . In fact, the mBDHI problem can be recognized by the following equation
The advantages of B 3 is ε 3 in solving the mBDHI problem is as follows: • ID ch is not queried in the Set-Private-Keyqueries.
• ID ch is not queried in the Trapdoor-queries. 5) Guess: A 4 returns ξ for ξ . B 4 picks a random input
Considering the L H 3 includes no more than q H 3 +q H 4 inputs, the chosen input will include the correct item ψ = e(C * 1 , S 1 ) with the probability 1/(q H 3 +2q H 4 ). In fact, the mBDHI problem can be recognized by the following equation ψ = e(C * 1 , S 1 ) = e(λ 1 P,
According to the proof in [3] , we have e(P, P) The proof of Lemma 4 is finished.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
When we consider computation and communication costs, the performance analysis of our suggested scheme and that of Qu et al.'s scheme [23] are discussed under this segment.
A. COMPUTATION COST
In Table 1 , the running times and symbols are presented. According to Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library [17] , the performance analysis are carried out on a personal computer (windows 10 pro operating system with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU @3.60 GHz @3.60 GHz and 8GB RAM) using C++. In our experiment, we made use of Type A pairings constructed from the curve z 2 = x 3 + x over a finite field F p . In addition, we realized 128 bits of RSA security levels [7] . According to Table 2 and FIGURE 3, the computation cost based on our suggested scheme is decreased by 96.40%, 32.08%, and 43.98% in Encryption, Decryption, and Test stages respectively, when compared with Qu et al.'s scheme.
B. COMMUNICATION COST
Suppose that the |PK |, |CT |, and |TD| represented the size of public key, the size of ciphertext, and the size of trapdoor, respectively. Assume that the size of each element in Z * p , G 1 , and G 2 are 20 bytes, 128 bytes, and 128 bytes, respectively. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The scheme we present in this paper can be implemented to provide an efficient search on the encrypted data accumulated within the cloud. This efficient CL-PKC-ET scheme takes the feature of the equality test that can perform the search between two keywords encrypted under the different public key as well as the same public key. In addition, the CL-PKC-ET scheme is constructed under the certificateless cryptosystem (CLC). Thus, it is solved the problems of certificate management which appeared with the equality test schemes constructed under the PKI cryptosystem and the key escrow problem which appeared with the equality test schemes constructed under the identity-based cryptosystem (IBC). Furthermore, we demonstrate the security of our scheme based on the OW-CCA and IND-CCA in the random oracle model assuming the mBDHI problem is intractable. We further evaluated our scheme regarding the computation and communication costs with the equality test scheme constructed under the CLC. Based on this comparison made with the scheme in [23] , our scheme accomplishes 96.40%, 32.08%, and 43.98% reduction in computation costs during the encryption, decryption and test stages, respectively. Therefore, we assert that this efficient CL-PKC-ET scheme is more preferable for deployment in both cloud and IoV environments. The future work consists of constructing CL-PKC-ET scheme without using the bilinear pairings.
